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Abstract—One of the fundamental applications for a practically
useful system of money is remuneration. Information pertaining
to the amount of compensation awarded to different individuals
is often considered sensitive, commanding a certain degree of
privacy. As Bitcoin and similarly designed cryptocurrencies evolve
into a recognized medium of exchange for larger swaths of
the world economy, an increasing number of people will earn
income in the form of blockchain-based payments. The nature of
these transactions is such that the minute details of an affected
individuals compensation package and spending habits will be
exposed to public scrutiny. In some cases this violates cultural
norms which respect the confidentiality of salaries, yet in other
cases it could be regarded as providing the benefits associated
with greater transparency. In this work we analyse the Bitcoin
blockchain record of periodic payments accruing to an individual
address in exchange for goods or services rendered. For differing
levels of available information we seek to determine the extent of
insights that can be gleaned about the transacting counter-parties
and the privacy implications this entails.
I. INTRODUCTION
All systems that preserve user privacy are alike; each system
that violates user privacy does so in its own way. Those
familiar with cryptocurrencies are aware that the mechanisms
by which social beings mutually exchange value are constantly
changing. Consider the modern word salary, derived from
the Latin salarium, the root of which means salt, an ancient
medium of exchange. To be “worth one’s salt” is an expression
meaning that one contributes value in proportion to the amount
one is paid. Under a regime of wages dispensed in salt there are
doubtless a considerable set of challenges to overcome in the
implementation and management of an efficient remuneration
system. This work considers the problems with which we are
confronted in the construction of systems build to compen-
sate workers with a contemporary exchange medium, namely
Bitcoin.
In many cultures workers are uncomfortable disclosing their
salaries publicly, yet for other professionals this information
constitutes part of the public record. Full disclosure of individ-
ual remuneration packages might violate personal privacy and
erode the competitive advantage of an organization. However
a policy of treating this data as openly available information
is not without some potential benefit. For instance the Ger-
man public servant remuneration grade table (Tarifvertrag fu¨r
den O¨ffentlichen Dienst der La¨nder1) describes how research
scientists, among others, are compensated for their labour.
Such open practices obviate the problems that arise from
1http://oeffentlicher-dienst.info/tv-l/
compensation differences between similarly skilled workers
based on spurious criteria.
In this work the authors were given access to an address on
the Bitcoin blockchain, hereafter referred to as Alice2, which
receives regular payments for goods and services rendered
from an institution which we will denote Bob & Company3.
Through an analysis of the data presented in the sections
to come, this work describes, as far as is known to the
authors, the first empirical study of the privacy characteristics
of live remuneration data extracted from the Bitcoin block-
chain. Insights discovered through the analysis of the data
are presented. Additionally we propose two heuristics for the
identification of remuneration behaviours taking place on the
Bitcoin blockchain.
II. OBFUSCATION TECHNIQUES
The poor privacy profile of blockchain-based currencies with
design principles analogous to those of Bitcoin is well estab-
lished [2]. The most common mitigation to the risk posed by
de-anonymization is to utilize a mix to shuffle bitcoins between
different users. There are several of such services operating
commercially and while specifics of the remedial measures
vary slightly according to the provider there are some common
drawbacks [5]. These include the propensity of anonymity
service providers to misappropriate funds, either explicitly or
by going out of business. As a result service providers typically
offer short duration mixing which entails low transaction
volumes and a restricted anonymity set. Additionally there is a
further risk that the service provider will keep track of the coins
they are ostensibly helping to anonymize and that eventually
this information will be compromised. Meiklejohn et al. [1]
have observed that among the mix services with whom they
interacted, one simply stole their money while another twice
returned the self-same coins, indicating that potentially they
were, at the time, the only customers.
While mixing theoretically is a credible solution to the prob-
lem of how to preserve confidentiality of remuneration for
employees compensated on the blockchain, in practice it
poses a new set of difficulties and adds considerably to the
complexity of the payroll process. Consider that the business
model of mix services necessitates users to pay a fee for each
transaction involving coins anonymized. Moreover the time
and risk associated with such services constitute a cost over
and above the explicit fee demanded for each mix. This serves
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as an impediment to organizations that seek to anonymize the
transaction profile of their compensation activity.
As alluded to above, the public nature of the Bitcoin transac-
tion log means that the use of pseudonyms is all that protects
an individual organization or employee’s privacy. For those
willing to consider cryptocurrencies other than Bitcoin two
alternative approaches for the compensation of workers are
Zerocoin and Zcash [3], both of which are blockchain-based
cryptocurrencies that preserve the integrity of personal data in
ways orthogonal to Bitcoin while posing their own unique set
of risks.
With issues of individual privacy there is often a trade-off
between confidentiality and convenience, both of which can
be evaluated on the basis of cost. Organizations implementing
business models that incorporate blockchain-based flows of
valuable information need to determine the requisite level of
privacy for their purposes and weigh this against the cost
of taking the measures necessary to ensure that this level of
privacy can be consistently achieved.
Fig. 1. Histogram of the 50 most recent transactions emanating from Bob
& Company. The y-axis represents the number of contributors, colleagues
of Alice. The x-axis represents calendar days. The regular periodicity of
payments to approximately the same number of addresses indicates behaviour
characteristic of remuneration.
III. EMPIRICAL STUDY
The tendency for payments to accrue to Alice at regular
intervals from the same address serves as a strong indicator
that these transactions constitute remuneration.
• 2016-12-12 → 0.01413267 BTC
• 2016-12-05 → 0.01731498 BTC
• 2016-11-23 → 0.00272750 BTC
• 2016-11-14 → 0.03295339 BTC
• 2016-11-07 → 0.00662214 BTC
• 2016-10-31 → 0.02340100 BTC
• 2016-10-17 → 0.00176991 BTC
• 2016-10-10 → 0.00928812 BTC
• 2016-10-03 → 0.01547708 BTC
• 2016-09-26 → 0.01503248 BTC
• 2016-09-19 → 0.02287458 BTC
• 2016-09-12 → 0.02176709 BTC
• 2016-09-05 → 0.01249299 BTC
• 2016-08-23 → 0.00240968 BTC
• 2016-08-15 → 0.01973261 BTC
The single address associated with Alice formed the initial
basis of our analysis. With this information alone it is trivial
to observe that Bob & Company is the sole source of all
the transactions listed above. By exploring the transaction
profile associated with Bob & Company we generated the
histogram in Figure 1, this information yields insight into (at
least) a consistent subset of the number of accounts payable
(presumably employees) with whom Bob & Company has
regularly interacted over the course of the time period
depicted. Based on the behaviour exhibited by Bob &
Company as described by Figure 1 we catalogue a heuristic
for the identification of organizations compensating employees
over the Bitcoin blockchain.
HEURISTIC 1 (REMUNERATION PROFILE). Whereas ad-
dress αo transmits payments to disparate addresses (α1, α...,
αn), for amounts consistently in the range ρ, at intervals ι,
with regularity ιτ ⇒ αo is affiliated with an organization of
which α1, α..., αn are employees.
Assignment of Heuristic 1 is complicated by the fact that over
the lifetime of the address affiliated with Bob & Company we
can observe three distinct patterns of behaviour, the first two
of which were not readily identifiable as constituting a profile
attributable to the remuneration of employees. This can be
discerned through careful examination of Figure 2 wherein
the first phase is characterized by largely random activity,
followed by a period of quiescence, and finally the structured
organizational behaviour described by Figure 1. The period
of activity described by Heuristic 1 is more recent than the
anomalous periods, therefore we weight it as more significant
to our analysis.
Fig. 2. The complete lifetime histogram of Bob & Company. The y-axis
represents number of addresses to whom transactions are broadcast, the x-
axis represents time.
Best privacy practices of Bitcoin recommend that a “fresh”,
never before used, address be utilized for each new transaction.
It is clear that neither Alice nor Bob & Company follow this
procedure. This fact notwithstanding, the majority of trans-
actions transmitted by Bob & Company do in fact appear to
follow the one address per transaction protocol. In Figure 3 we
can see a comprehensive break-down of the transactions made
by Bob & Company to distinct addresses. The Green section
(64.38%), the majority of cases, represents transmission to
an address that has never before been issued to by Bob &
Company and is never issued to again.
Fig. 3. The proportion of transactions partitioned according to the number
of times Bob & Company transmitted Bitcoin to the address in question.
Generally the Bitcoin transmissions from Bob & Company
occur at consistent intervals, categorized by a certain regularity
in time. While this is true for the majority of addresses
to whom Bob & Company transmit it is not a universal
rule, this is observable in the discrepancy between Figure
4, a representative example of (temporally) regular Bitcoin
transmissions, and Figure 5, which depicts (atypically for Bob
& Company) a highly irregular pattern of behaviour.
Fig. 4. Prototypical example of transactions from Bob & Company to an
address, note the characteristic regularity. The x-axis is the amount in Bitcoin,
the y-axis represents time.
Fig. 5. Observe that although the majority of transactions emanating from
Bob & Company are quite regular there are still those that are described by
highly erratic activity as we see here. The x-axis is the amount in Bitcoin, the
y-axis represents time.
A. Volatility in Amount of Bitcoin Transmitted
In stark contrast to the regularity in terms of periodicity
of transactions by Bob & Company is the irregularity in
the amount of Bitcoin involved in each transaction. One of
the reasons for this is that compensation to employees will
fluctuate with the value of Bitcoin. As such if transactions
closely track a consistent benchmark or reference point in a
national currency, such as the United States dollar, it is another
strong indicator that they represent salary payments.
Fig. 6. The median transaction value in Bitcoin sent by Bob & Company
over the lifetime of the address. Note that as the price of Bitcoin increases
relative to the United States dollar the value of transactions emanating from
Bob & Company is decreasing in rough proportion.
HEURISTIC 2 (BENCHMARK TARGET). If the medianM of
payments transmitted PT by address αo to disparate addresses
(α1, α..., αn), consistently tracks a target value of national
currency N , across various exchange rate (E) climates⇒ PT
are remuneration for goods or services rendered.
In November of 2014 when the price of one Bitcoin was
approximately USD $340.00 the average compensation from
Bob & Company was 0.25 Bitcoin per transaction. In Decem-
ber of 2016 when one Bitcoin typically sold for a price of
approximately USD $930.00, the average compensation from
Bob & Company was 0.05 Bitcoin per transaction. Therefore,
from the period during which data is first available for Bob
& Company until the time of writing, the price of Bitcoin
has increased and the amount of remuneration from Bob
& Company have decreased in proportion to each other as
described by Figure 6.
IV. COST CALCULATION
The practical considerations involved in deploying mixing
services and the degree of scale necessary to meet large payroll
obligations are multitudinous. Organizations and institutions
that need to regularly transmit large payments make themselves
susceptible to attacks well known to the communication mix-
ing community, e.g. packet counting, or the intersection attack.
Even if one were to employ the services of a mix, with the
risks that this entails, one is still left exposed to side channel
attacks from an adversary that is sufficiently committed.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The practice of compensating employees via blockchain-
based cryptocurrencies has made possible the realization of
heretofore unimagined business models. Bitcoin facilitates the
compensation of contributing individuals across the world
regardless of whether or not they have a consistent home
address or a bank account. The practice of paying salaries
with this contemporary medium of exchange is growing in,
if not popularity, at least notoriety, as indicated by corpora-
tions ranging from machine learning focused hedge funds to
small start-ups proclaiming their affinity for remunerating their
workers using Bitcoin [4]. In this work we have demonstrated
the substantive privacy concerns raised by the practice of
awarding salaries using cryptocurrencies with design principles
similar to those of Bitcoin by the meticulous analysis of
live blockchain data. In this section we explore some of the
implications of the possibilities unleashed by this mechanism
of disseminating personal salaries.
A. Industrial Espionage
In this work we were able to track the growth of Bob &
Company. If this analysis were undertaken by a competitor of
Bob & Company it could erode their competitive advantage
by divulging information relating directly to the economic
viability, growth patterns and trajectory of Bob & Company’s
business.
B. Endangering Employees
The Women’s Annex Foundation (WAF)4 encourages girls in
Afghanistan to engage in blog writing, software development,
video production and social media marketing, paying them for
their efforts in Bitcoin. The heuristics described in this work
could be used to identify organizations on the blockchain,
organization like the WAF. Business models with similar
objectives do well to consider whether compensating workers
via the blockchain is consistent with promoting the well being
of their contributors and if decided in the affirmative, to
take all necessary precautions to sufficiently anonymize their
transaction profile.
4http://digitalcitizenfund.org/
C. Corporate Governance
While doubtless there are ills associated with increased trans-
parency there are also considerable benefits. Increased over-
sight, transparency, and participation on behalf of stake-holders
is realizable as never before through the deployment of public
ledger based value transmission systems. This could herald a
new ethos in corporate governance.
D. Open Budget Initiative
There are at the moment projects underway from various
governments and civic institutions, e.g. the World Bank In-
stitute, to promote the kind of budget transparency that can
decrease corruption and improve living standards, the kind of
transparency detailed in this work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the early days of Bitcoin the perceived anonymity of
this value transfer technology was one of it’s most attractive
features, helping to fuel it’s adoption on marketplaces such as
the Silk Road. Today it is clear that the anonymity guarantees
of Bitcoin are tenuous. This work provides a foundation for
the creation of mechanisms that might search the blockchain
for evidence of remuneration behaviour taking place using
cryptocurrencies, i.e. Bitcoin. In consideration of the ethics
of anonymity we do well not to overlook the multitude of
important reasons for anonymity that we might take for granted
with traditional currencies. It is still the case that many people
are uncomfortable divulging the details of their salaries with
friends or coworkers. The relative ease with which individual
addresses in the Bitcoin blockchain can be associated with a
salary through the heuristics herein presented demonstrates a
host of new challenges and opportunities. This work represents
a first step in the determination of what this paradigm shift
will ultimately have in store for the way we relate and interact
with one another through one of the oldest social technologies,
money.
DISCLAIMER
The authors of this work obtained explicit permission from the
owners of the addresses under direct consideration to conduct
the empirical study herein presented.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Meiklejohn, M. Pomarole, G. Jordan, K. Levchenko, D. McCoy,
G.M. Voelker, and S. Savage, A fistful of bitcoins: characterizing pay-
ments among men with no names. Proceedings of the 2013 conference
on Internet measurement conference 127–140, 2013.
[2] I. Miers, C. Garman, M. Green, A.D. Rubin, Zerocoin: Anonymous
distributed e-cash from bitcoin. Security and Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE
Symposium 397–411, 2013.
[3] E.B. Sasson, A. Chiesa, C. Garman, M. Green, I. Miers, E. Tromer, and
M. Virza, Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments from bitcoin.
2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 459–474, 2014.
[4] M. Cade, 7,500 Faceless Coders Paid in Bitcoin Built a Hedge
Funds Brain. https://www.wired.com/2016/12/7500-faceless-coders-
paid-bitcoin-built-hedge-funds-brain/, 12.12.2016.
[5] E. Androulaki, G.O. Karame, M. Roeschlin, T. Scherer, S. Capkun, Eval-
uating user privacy in bitcoin. International Conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, 34–51, 2013.
